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Abstract 
Following standard Austrian School theory, in this paper I identify merger waves as 
parts of Austrian type business cycles. As indicated by Mises, Rothbard and Hayek, when 
loan rates are reduced below their natural level through bank credit expansion this falsifies 
the monetary calculation of capitalist-entrepreneurs. As a result, new investments are 
initiated that calculation showed were not profitable before the interest rate reduction. On 
the other hand, the fall in interest rates falsifies households’ appraisals of their income and 
wealth, which turns them overly optimistic and causes them to over-consume, save less and 
go into debt. As a consequence of these developments the economy does not have enough 
resources for the completion of the new projects and businesses must increasingly withdraw 
the resources from other companies. I conclude that the increase in investment activity and 
the accompanying “resource crunch” cause a merger wave that helps prolong the boom 
phase of the cycle. The merger wave ends when the credit expansion is not sufficient to 
sustain the economic boom (which usually occurs when central banks finally let interest 
rates rise again and an overextended financial system tightens credit standards) and the bust 
phase begins. On the other hand, if the newly created fiduciary media does not enter the 
economy through the loan market to finance business investment, there should be no 
pronounced and sustained increase in merger activity followed by an economic bust. 
KEYWORDS:  Austrian business cycle, merger waves, Austrian, Neoclassical, Behavioral 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: B53, E32, G34 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main puzzles in contemporary mainstream financial economics is: why are 
there time periods of frantic Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity known as merger 
waves? While in this literature much work has been done on the causes of takeovers and 
restructuring activity at the firm and industry level, relatively little work has been done on 
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the causes of economy wide merger waves. Moreover, the latter is divided in two rival 
camps: behavioral and neoclassic. 
According to the “behavioral hypothesis” of merger waves during bull markets 
investors irrationally misprice stocks across the board and rational managers, taking 
advantage of misperceived merger synergies, use their overvalued stock to acquire the 
resources of less overvalued or undervalued companies. The main proponents of this theory 
are Shleifer and Vishny (2003). On the other hand, the “neoclassical hypothesis” maintains 
that merger waves are rational responses by market participants that occur when economic 
shocks (economic, regulatory, or technological) which call for industrial reorganization, 
overlap with low transaction costs that take place because of the presence of high “capital 
liquidity”. Where, the role of capital liquidity is to reduce the costs of reallocating the 
assets thus permitting a large volume of transactions to occur in a relatively short period of 
time. The main proponent of the neoclassical theory is Harford (2005).2 
From an Austrian perspective, however, the causes proposed by these two schools (i.e. 
overvaluation of stocks or economic shocks followed by high capital liquidity which 
reduces transaction costs) cannot be accepted as ultimate causes of merger waves. Although 
these factors may plausibly have an influence in the direction of the actual market process 
during an economic boom and the accompanying merger wave, the causes of their 
occurrence can be explained in turn at a more basic level in the context of the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory (ABCT).  
                                                            
2 There is a growing body of empirical literature that aims to test the hypotheses of the neoclassical and 
behavioral schools which has yielded mixed results. Some of the relevant work includes Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005), Dong et al. (2006), Gärtner et al. (2009) and Gugler et al. (2012). 
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Following standard Austrian theory step by step, in this paper I identify merger waves 
as parts of Austrian Business Cycles. The argument is briefly as follows: when bank credit 
expansion reduces loan rates below their natural level, capitalist-entrepreneurs3 will tend to 
undertake more investments than can be completed with the resources available in the 
economy. The initiation of these projects launches an unsustainable economic boom, and 
due to the escalating scarcity of resources aggravated by household overconsumption, 
businesses must increasingly withdraw the resources from other companies. I conclude that 
this increase in investment activity together with the accompanying “resource crunch” 
causes the merger wave. If this logical deduction is correct, then the two standard theories 
in mainstream financial economics mentioned above are leaving out important causes of the 
merger wave such as the increase in investments and the scarcity of resources during the 
economic boom. Also note that in this context, the phenomenon of stock overvaluation 
highlighted by the behavioral school can be explained, as a result of the reduction of 
interest rates (when interest rates are artificially pushed downwards asset prices will tend to 
artificially increase), and also as a result of the increased demand for the resources that the 
stocks give title to. On the other hand, the high “capital liquidity” pointed out by the 
neoclassical school is explained in the context of ABCT as a result of bank credit 
expansion.4  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 I briefly go over the main 
arguments of ABCT and indicate how merger waves rise and wane. In section 3, I provide 
                                                            
3 The capitalist-entrepreneurs are “the speculators, promoters, investors and money lenders” who determine 
“the structure of the stock and commodity exchanges and of the money market” and the “allocation of capital 
to firms and industries.” See Mises (1998, p. 704) and Rothbard (1991, p. 58). 
4 Theoretical variations on the neoclassical and behavioral themes are provided by Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Gugler et al. (2012). However, since these theories are 
susceptible to the same critique above I do not consider it necessary to discuss them here. 
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an illustration of the theory by examining the history for the United States in the last 20 
years. In particular, I draw attention to the fact that when fiduciary media entered the 
economy through the loan market to finance business investment, Austrian Business cycles 
accompanied by merger waves occurred, but that when newly created money did not enter 
the economy through the loan market to finance business investment, there was no 
pronounced and sustained spike in merger activity although stock prices and liquidity were 
at historic highs. I conclude in section 4 by summing up and reinterpreting some of the 
findings of the behavioral and neoclassical schools in light of the Austrian theory. 
2.  MERGER WAVES AS PART OF ABCT 
According to the ABCT the business cycle is caused by a reduction of the interest rate 
below its natural level when newly produced fiduciary media, created by the financial 
system, enters the economy through the loan market and falsifies the monetary calculation 
of capitalist-entrepreneurs and households (Mises, 1998; Hayek, 2008; Rothbard, 2009). 
This artificial reduction in the rates of interest has two effects which constitute the essential 
features of the Austrian Business Cycle: “malinvestment” and “overconsumption” (Salerno, 
2012).   
On the one hand, the artificial reduction of interest rates leads capitalist-entrepreneurs 
to believe that society has become thriftier and that the level of savings has increased, when 
in fact the interest rate is too low in comparison with society’s time preference. This in turn 
prompts them to overestimate the amount of resources available to invest and to begin more 
projects than can be finished with the available means of production. Moreover, the 
proportion of longer term projects will increase relative to short term projects as their 
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present value will increase more due to the interest rate reduction, and as a consequence the 
structure of production is lengthened. This unsustainable lengthening of the structure of 
production constitutes the malinvestment feature of the inflationary boom. On the other 
hand, the fall in interest rates also falsifies households’ appraisals of their income and 
wealth. This comes about through what is called the “wealth effect”. As the inflationary 
boom proceeds and factors of production become more scarce, salaries are bid up and asset 
prices (such as stocks and real state) also go higher (Bagus, 2008). Thus households feel 
wealthier and more optimistic about their future income streams. This causes them to over-
consume, save less and even go into debt as they mistakenly believe they can afford it. This 
constitutes the overconsumption aspect of the Austrian Business Cycle (Salerno, 2012).  
Overconsumption aggravates even more the erroneous assessment regarding the 
availability of investable resources made by the capitalist-entrepreneurs, and the scarcity of 
all kinds of resources eventually becomes evident as prices for those resources start to soar. 
As businesses increase their demands from the several resource and labor markets, these 
ultimately become depleted and the resources, if available, of relatively lower quality and 
expensive. Therefore, firms must increasingly withdraw resources from other companies. 
As pointed out by Klein (1999) company managements supplement their normal forms 
of investment (i.e. capital expenditures and R&D) by purchasing the assets of existing firms 
through merger. Thus, as investment activity increases in the earlier stages of the boom, it 
is logical to deduce that merger activity will increase as well, and this initiates the merger 
wave. However, as mentioned above the economy’s resources are not sufficient to complete 
all the projects. Thus the question that capitalist-entrepreneurs and their managements 
ultimately face is: what can be done to finalize the investments or at least to continue them 
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one more period of time? Clearly, if resources are scarce and costly, it should become 
easier for capitalist-entrepreneurs and firm managements to see the operating economies 
that can result from eliminating duplicate facilities, and consolidating the marketing, 
purchasing and accounting operations. On the other hand, during the boom synergy and 
economy of scale stories are easier to make and back with numbers. For example, a 
company that increases its productive capacity may find its sales force inadequate and that 
synergies can be achieved by merging with another firm with a strong sales force. Thus, in 
order to complete the projects one solution can be either to purchase another company or 
sell your own firm to a business that has the resources to complement your investments. In 
addition, this would also have the advantage of reducing the number of firms competing for 
the same pool of resources. 
I conclude that, facing a “resource crunch,” businesses must increasingly find it 
advantageous to merge with other companies. Therefore, during the inflationary boom one 
should expect to see both, an exceptionally high demand of resources in the different 
markets (manifested, for example, in a very low unemployment rate and high resource 
prices) and an unusually high level of M&A activity. Interestingly, this also explains why 
past economic booms have seemed to last longer than one would expect if companies could 
only draw their factors of production from the different resource and labor markets. By 
taking their resources from other companies through merger, capitalist-entrepreneurs and 
their managements can carry out their projects for one more period of time. 
In this context, the economic, regulatory and technological shocks proposed by the 
neoclassical literature (Harford, 2005) have a role in determining in which industries the 
merger wave is more pronounced. In particular, as Callahan and Garrison (2003, p. 74) 
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have pointed out “every bubble needs a story, which early investors can tell to later ones to 
justify rising asset prices” and it is clear that technological innovation such as the internet 
in the 1990s and episodes of deregulation can serve this purpose. This is not to deny that an 
economic, regulatory or technological shock can prompt a legitimate reallocation of assets 
in an industry. Austrian Theory demonstrates that, in the absence of bank credit expansion, 
capitalist-entrepreneurs relying on sound monetary calculation would proficiently 
undertake the reallocation of assets over time with some occasional errors, but nothing in 
the way of a manic episode with a clustering of entrepreneurial error ending in an economy 
wide crisis. The important point is that, in a monetary regime in which bank credit 
expansion is allowed, the merger wave should be more pronounced in those industries 
where there is a good story to justify the high asset prices. And a convincing economic, 
regulatory or technological shock can provide such a narrative. 
The merger wave ends with the Austrian type business cycle, when the credit 
expansion is not sufficient to sustain the economic boom, which usually occurs when 
central banks finally detect in their aggregate measurements that price inflation is 
increasing sharply. At this point the authorities have two options, to continue stimulating 
the economy and risking a “crack-up boom” (Mises, 1998), or tighten monetary policy and 
let interest rates rise again. If the latter option is chosen, the overextended financial system 
becomes increasingly concerned as the errors committed in the boom become evident, 
credit standards are tightened and the crisis begins. As a result, consumption and 
investment plummet, unemployment rises and M&A activity falls.  
Finally, it is important to point out that if the newly created fiduciary media does not 
enter the economy through the loan market to finance business investment and distort the 
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structure of production, there is no Austrian type boom-bust cycle. If so, there should be no 
pronounced and sustained spike in merger activity and the accompanying clustering of 
entrepreneurial error. 
3. HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATION 
In this section I provide an illustration of the Austrian merger wave theory elaborated 
in this paper by examining the history for the United States in the last 20 years. During this 
period Austrian economists and commentators successfully identified and warned in 
advance about the boom and the subsequent bust of two Austrian type business cycles 
developing in the U.S. economy (Thornton, 2013). Moreover, after each of the busts 
Austrian economists such as Callahan and Garrison (2003) and Salerno (2012) provided 
detailed accounts about the two episodes as well as commentaries about the prospects for 
the future. Hence, in what follows I take it as an established historical fact that there 
occurred two Austrian type business cycles in the period under question, and therefore, my 
focus will be in indicating how merger waves were a part of these boom-bust cycles. 
First Business Cycle (from 1995 to 2002). According to Callahan and Garrison 
(2003), the first business cycle in the relevant period occurred between 1995 and 2002. In 
their paper, the immediate cause of the cycle is identified as the loose monetary policy of 
the FED prior to the 1996 presidential elections. The Asian Crisis of 1997, the subsequent 
Russian default, the Long Term Capital Market (LTCM) crisis and the Y2K scare forced 
the FED to continue with its expansive monetary stance through early 2000, even though 
the economy was showing signs of overheating. The resultant low interest rates and 
fiduciary media created by the financial system falsified the capitalist-entrepreneurs 
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monetary calculation which in turn started to malinvest notably in dot-com and 
telecommunication companies, but also in other sectors of the economy. Figure 1 shows the 
high levels of net private investment during the boom. Here I take net investment rather 
than gross investment given that the former is a measurement of expenditure in excess of 
that required to maintain the existing capital structure. As can be seen net investment 
peaked in 2000. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 The monetary stimulus also resulted in overall high stock prices which peaked in 
March of 2000 (Figure 2) and through the “wealth effect” induced households to over-
consume, produced a collapse in savings and an increase in household indebtedness. In 
particular, households reduced their personal savings rate from around 9% in the early 
1990s to 4% in 1999-2000 (Figure 3). Additionally, the increase in indebtedness is reflected 
in the increment in debt service payments as a percent of personal disposable income which 
increased from 11% to close to 13% in the 1990s (Figure 4). 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Crucially, the capital consumption and malinvestment resulted in a shortage of 
resources and workers in the different industries. In their paper, Callahan and Garrison 
(2003, p. 87) draw attention to the scarcity of resources in the dot-com sector: 
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There were too few resources available for all of the plans formulated and funded during 
the boom to succeed… There were shortages of programmers, network engineers, technical 
managers, office space, housing for workers, and other factors of production. 
Finally, Callahan and Garrison indicate that the business cycle ended when FED 
tightened monetary policy in 2000 and punctured the bubble. As a result, an economic 
recession ensued and the 1990s boom came to an end. 
I conclude from the foregoing that as investment activity increased in the earlier stages 
of the boom (Figure 1), merger activity also increased as company managements 
supplemented their normal forms of investment (i.e. capital expenditures and R&D) by 
purchasing the assets of existing firms through merger. This initiated the merger wave.  
Moreover, I deduce that the “resource crunch” described by Callahan and Garrison (2003) 
intensified the merger wave of the late 1990s and allowed the boom to persist for a while. 
Clearly, resources were scarce and costly, and in order to complete the projects capitalist-
entrepreneurs and their managements had only two solutions: either to purchase another 
company and use the resources contained in therein, or sell the firm to a business that has 
the complementary resources to bring the project to fruition lest the enterprise results in a 
total loss. In this context, the usual justifications for mergers such as operating economies, 
synergies and economies of scales can be backed using (falsified) economic calculation. 
Finally, the merger wave ended when the bust set in and the errors committed during the 
boom became manifest to most economic actors (e.g. the evident overcapacity in the 
telecommunications industry). As a result some of the investments lost most of their value 
and others had to be liquidated.  
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The merger wave is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. As can be seen the value of 
completed M&A transactions during the period of the boom-bust cycle described by 
Callahan and Garrison (2003) tripled from around $600 billion in 1995 to $1800 billion in 
2000 and then fell considerably to slightly over $500 billion in 2002 once the bust set in. 
This is also, reflected in the number of completed M&A transactions which increased from 
slightly over 9,000 in 1995 to over 12,800 in 1998 and then fell to 7,400 in 2002. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
Second Business Cycle (from 2002 to 2009).  The second Austrian type business 
cycle in the period under study occurred between 2002 and 2009 and is described in detail 
by Salerno (2012). The author describes how the FED reacted immediately to the recession 
of the early 2000s by aggressively lowering interest rates and taking measures to expand 
the money supply. Notably, the FED kept the Federal Funds rate under 2 percent for three 
years from December 2001 to November 2004. More importantly, there was a sharp 
reduction in 30 year conventional mortgage rates and adjustable mortgage rates, which 
combined with loose credit standards resulted in a housing bubble (during which housing 
prices were registering double-digit annual increases) that peaked in 2006. The monetary 
stimulus also caused a steep ascent in stock prices which continued go up until 2007 
(Figure 2). These developments created a “wealth effect” that led households to 
overconsume and go into debt, as stated by Salerno (2012, p. 30): 
Misled by their inflation-bloated balance sheets, households were induced to “cash out” 
some of their home equity and increase expenditures on consumer goods and services. In 
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the expression of the day, people began “using their homes as ATM machines.” Households 
financed their increased spending on boats, luxury autos, upscale restaurant meals, pricy 
vacations etc., through fixed-dollar debt. 
The wealth illusion also produced a reduction in saving. As shown in Figure 3, the 
personal saving rate as a percent of disposable income fell from slightly over 5% in early 
2002 to 2% in 2005.  
On the other hand, the extent of the malinvestments during the 2002-2009 boom-bust 
cycle is illustrated in Figure 1. As can be seen, after falling to $538 billion in 2002, net 
private domestic investment resumed its growth and reached a peak at $848 billion in 2006. 
As in the previous cycle, the boom came to an end as the FED raised interest rates. On this 
occasion, the errors committed during the boom became dramatically manifest in the 
housing market. This had dire implications for the financial system as most of the housing 
investors were highly levered with bank credit and their mass defaults brought the prospect 
of the failure of many banks. This in turn triggered bank runs and financial instability 
which, according to reports in the mainstream media, prompted the Federal Government 
and the Federal Reserve to take unprecedented measures to prevent a financial collapse.  
Importantly, in this second boom-bust cycle it is possible to discern the same pattern in 
M&A activity. As investment activity started to pick up again in 2003 (Figure 1), M&A 
activity also started to increase as company managements supplemented their investments 
in R&D and capital expenditures with mergers and acquisitions (Figures 5 and 6). 
Moreover, as the overconsumption described by Salerno (2012) and net private investment 
intensified, another “resource crunch” situation developed, which intensified the merger 
13 
 
wave. The mergers allowed the boom to temporarily continue for a while. The merger wave 
ended when as the FED tightened monetary policy triggering the bust.  
As shown in Figure 5, the value of completed M&A transactions more than tripled 
from $506 billion in 2002 to $1688 billion in 2007 and then almost halved to $854 billion 
in 2009.  The merger wave is also reflected in the number of completed M&A transactions 
(Figure 6), which increased from 7,460 in 2002 to 12,394 in 2007 and then fell to 7,873 in 
2009. 
Economic stagnation (from 2009 to …). Following the financial crisis, the FED 
reacted aggressively with a series of Quantitative Easing (QE) programs that have boosted 
the monetary base at an unprecedented rate (Figure 7). In addition, the FED reduced the 
Federal Funds rate to close to zero percent in December 2008 where they have been kept 
and are expected to be maintained for the foreseeable future, and has taken steps to bring 
down long term interest rates as well (the so-called “Operation Twist”). 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
Although these measures have succeeded in re-inflating stock market price indices 
which have recently reached historic highs (Figure 2), on this occasion the stimulus has 
failed to restore the growth of bank credit expansion to the double-digit annual growth rates 
observed during the last two business cycles (Figure 8), and net private domestic 
investment has remained depressed with the 2012 figure 60 percent below the 2006 high of 
$849 billion (Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
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Thus in the period after the financial crisis, the newly created money has not entered 
the economy through the loan market to finance business investment. Instead the money 
has been flowing to the financial markets to inflate the prices of financial assets and to 
finance trillion dollar Federal Government deficits. In contrast, households have started to 
save more with the personal savings rate increasing from around 2 percent before the latest 
recession to between 4 to 6 percent for most of the period after the crisis (Figure 3). 
Now, if the newly created money is not entering the economy through the loan market 
to finance business investment to distort the structure of production, there can be no boom-
bust cycle of the Austrian type. Instead, Austrian theory indicates that there will be price 
inflation and wealth redistribution from the productive classes of society to those best 
placed to take advantage of the consequences of the inflation. Moreover, as pointed out in 
section 2 above, if there is no Austrian business cycle developing there ought not to be a 
pronounced and sustained spike in M&A activity followed by a crisis that reveals a cluster 
of investment errors on the part of capitalist-entrepreneurs.  
Interestingly, contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical and behavioral theories of 
merger waves, in a period such as the one at hand in which capitalist-entrepreneurs have 
temporarily lost their confidence in the reliability of economic calculation (Salerno, 2012) 
and regime uncertainty is high (Higgs, 1997; Id., 2012), there should be no merger wave 
even though (a) stock prices are being inflated to record highs through monetary policy 
(conflicting with the behavioral theory), and (b) strong economic shocks and dislocations 
overlap with unprecedented levels of liquidity in the stock markets (opposite to the 
neoclassical theory).  
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This conclusion of no merger wave without Austrian type business cycle is consistent 
with the history of M&A activity in the period after the financial crisis. As shown in Figure 
5, after falling to $850 and $890 billion in 2009 and 2010 respectively there was a “dead cat 
bounce” in the value of completed M&A activity in 2011 to $1,100 billion before falling 
back again to $835 billion in 2012. All of these figures are between 35 to 50 percent lower 
than the high reached in the previous cycle of $1,688 billion in 2007, so there are no signs 
of a merger mania when examining the value of M&A activity after the financial crisis. 
Additionally, Figure 6 shows that a pronounced spike in the number of completed M&A 
transactions has also not occurred, after falling to 7,873 deals in 2009, the number of 
transactions has gradually increased to 9,107 in 2012, this latter number still 26% below the 
12,394 figure reached in 2007.  
4. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of the business cycle, their accompanying merger waves and the 
economic impoverishment they bring are not a feature of the free market as many 
economists have uncritically assumed. Instead, as the Austrian school maintains, these 
phenomena are the result of the way in which the monetary and banking system have been 
historically organized. To prevent business cycles and merger waves the solution would 
involve a reform in which the reduction of interest rates below their natural level through 
bank credit expansion is ruled out. 
Once an Austrian type boom-bust cycle is under way, the behavioral school is correct, I 
believe, in that some of the M&A activity will occur as managers, taking advantage of 
misperceived merger synergies, use their overvalued stock to acquire the resources of less 
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overvalued or undervalued companies. However, the cause of the radical mispricing of the 
stocks are not some mysterious “animal spirits”, rather it is the result of the falsification of 
the households’ and capitalist-entrepreneurs’ monetary calculation. This suggests that in 
addition to studying human behavior under uncertainty, behavioral economists should also 
study human behavior under false information about their wealth, income and investment 
prospects.  
 On the other hand, the neoclassical school has a point in indicating that economic, 
technological and regulatory shocks and excessive liquidity have a role in merger waves. 
However, in the context of the ABCT the role of the shocks is to provide a story to justify 
the bubble as Callahan and Garrison (2003) have pointed out. In this sense, the bubble will 
tend to be more pronounced in those sectors where a more credible case for the high prices 
can be made. Moreover, the excess liquidity is not something that just happens cyclically 
and endogenously in the free market. Instead it is the result of the monetary intervention 
and the bank credit expansion that existing institutional arrangements allow. On the other 
hand, the neoclassical school is too sanguine in supposing that virtually all economic 
activity that takes place in the real world is an optimal response to some disturbance and 
that capitalist-entrepreneurs are basically omniscient and never make mistakes. In fact, 
capitalist-entrepreneurs do make mistakes and under free market capitalism with sound 
money entrepreneurs would still make some mistakes evenly over time. What needs 
explanation is why entrepreneurial mistakes tend to cluster and are identified at some points 
in time called recessions, and I submit that ABCT is our best explanation of why these 
clusters of entrepreneurial mistakes occur. 
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Ultimately, from the perspective of the Austrian school, the behavioral and 
neoclassical schools do not identify the underlying causes of merger waves. Although the 
factors proposed may plausibly have an influence in the direction of the actual market 
process during an economic boom and the accompanying merger wave, the causes of their 
occurrence can be explained a more basic level in the context of ABCT. Financial 
economists would do well to incorporate the insights of the Austrian school in their work; 
many of the puzzles of modern finance could be solved in this way. 
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